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IMPLICATIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
STANDARD FOR TRANSBOUNDARY
MANAGEMENT OF GULF OF MAINE-
GEORGES BANK FISHERY RESOURCES
Bruce N. Shibles*
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly ten years ago, the International Court of Justice made its
landmark decision delimiting the United States (U.S.)-Canadian
maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine.' That decision was expected
to open a new chapter in U.S.-Canadian maritime relations by forcing
cooperative management of transboundary2 fishing stocks for one of the
world's richest fishing grounds-Georges Bank.3 The shared manage-
ment of this region was not considered problematic by the World Court
* Assistant City Solicitor for the City of Bangor, Maine; M.S. Coastal Zone
Management 1982, Florida Institute of Technology; J.D. 1987, University of Maine
School of Law. This article is an updated revision of an article that appeared in V
TERrroRAL SEA 3 (1985) at 1-12.
1. Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of
Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12) [hereinafter Gulf of Maine Case].
2. "Transboundary fishery stocks" or "transboundary stocks" as used in this Article
means those stocks of fish that at different times in their life cycle are found within the
fisheries jurisdiction of two or more countries. This could mean, for example, that a
stock might spawn under one jurisdiction and feed in another, or that within the course
of its seasonal movements the stock crosses the boundary of two or more countries'
exclusive economic zones (EEZ).
3. Georges Bank supports a wide variety of commercially important fish species,
including cod, haddock, yellowtail flounder, pollock, winter flounder, American plaice,
and redfish. These species range over the entire Georges Bank and are thus divided by
the new boundary line. Memorial of the United States (Can. v. U.S.), Pt. I, Ch. II, §§
1-3 at 37, Fig. 7 and at 207, Fig. 36 (Sept. 27, 1982); Annexes to Counter-Memorial-
Canada, Vol. I, Chs. I & IV and at 106, Fig. 60 (June 28, 1983).
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due to the positive history of U.S.-Canadian relations.4 Until recently,
however, there has been very little shared management in the Georges
Bank region.
Fish stocks in Georges Bank have been steadily declining,' and are
currently at an all time low. This decline has occurred despite restric-
tions on open fishing areas and landing limits that have been imposed on
the fisheries in that area since the passage of the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act.6 A recent, stark example of the
effects of this decline is the joint closure of the New England haddock
fishery by Canada and the U.S. due to severe depletion of stocks caused
by overfishing.7 The current condition of the Georges Bank fishery
indicates that the United States and Canada have not effectively managed
the fishery resources within their own exclusive economic zones (EEZ).
It further demonstrates the consequences of their failure to successfully
manage the shared resources of Georges Bank.
In the past few years there have been limited efforts in cooperative
fisheries management between the two countries. The recently approved
Canada-United States Agreement of Fisheries Enforcement' now re-
quires that each country prohibit its fishermen from operating contrary
to fisheries laws of the other country, while in that country's waters.
Fishermen who violate the laws can no longer escape enforcement action
4. Jan Schneider, The First ICJ Chamber Experiment: The Gulf of Maine Case: The
Nature of an Equitable Result, 79 AM. J. INT'L L., 539 (1985) (citing Can. v. U.S., 1984
I.C.J. 246, 1 238 (Oct. 12)).
5. The most obvious result from the lack of cooperative efforts has been the steady
decline in groundfish stocks in the Georges Bank region. "[From 1965 to 1992], annual
commercial landings of groundfish ... declined from 750,000 metric tons ... to roughly
175,000 metric tons." 138 CONG. REC. S8186 (daily ed., June 15, 1992) (statement of
Sen. Mitchell).
6. 16 U.S.C.A. §§1801-1882 (1988).
7. 59 Fed. Reg. 26 (Jan. 3, 1994), Emergency Interim Rule. The Secretary of
Commerce approved the adoption of Amendment 5 to the New England Fishery
Management Council's Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan (FMP) which
will further limit the number of days the fishery will be open after the emergency
January 3, 1994 to April 2, 1994 closing. In addition, it reduces landing limits to 500
pounds per trip and closes over 2000 square miles to fishing. These limits will cut in
half the amount of haddock taken by U.S. fishermen from Georges Bank in 1993.
Canada has agreed to join the U.S. in closing the haddock fishery until June 1, 1994.
Janice M. Plante, What To Do About Haddock? COMMERCIAL FISHERIES NEws, Dec.
1993 at 8A.
8. See 137 CONG. REc. S71 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1991) and H. Doc. 102-22, Sept. 26,
1990.
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by retreating to their own waters. This agreement made a positive step
toward reducing tensions in the boundary areas between the countries and
toward improving U.S.-Canadian coastal conservation efforts.
Additionally, in recognition that cooperative fishery management
plans between the two countries are more urgently needed than ever
before, -the U.S. Congress has renewed its efforts to pass the necessary
enabling legislation9 to allow the U.S. to become a participating member
of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO).10 Although
U.S. boats do not now regularly fish outside the EEZ, membership in
NAFO would give the U.S. the opportunity to exchange scientific data
about the fish stocks in the region, and would give the government
leverage to negotiate a fishing quota for U.S. fishermen." Most
critically for the Georges Bank region, the legislation authorizes negotia-
tions between the U.S. and Canada to seek a mutually beneficial manage-
ment agreement for transboundary stocks,12 particularly cod and
9. Originally introduced in September, 1993 as H.R. 3058, the bill was combined
with the Fisheries Enforcement in Central Sea of Okhotsk Act, and was passed in the
House as H.R. 3188, 703d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The bill was still pending in the
Senate as of March 1, 1994.
10. NAFO is the successor organization to the International Commission on
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF). When States expanded their exclusive economic
zones to 200 miles, the convention upon which ICNAF was based became obsolete and
member states, including the U.S., withdrew. Later, the United States was very active
in the negotiations which led to the development of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Convention, the agreement which established NAFO. The convention was ratified by the
U.S. in 1983, but the enabling legislation was not enacted. 139 CONG. REc. E2159
(daily ed. Sept. 14, 1993) (remarks of Rep. Studds). The original signatories to NAFO
were Canada, Cuba, the European Economic Community, the German Democratic
Republic, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the U.S.S.R. Subsequently, Bulgaria,
Denmark, Japan, Poland, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have joined. STAFF
OF SUBCOMMITTEEON FISHERIES MANAGEMENT, 103D CONG., 1ST SaSS., CAPITOL HILL
HEARING TESTIMONY ON INTERNATIONAL STRADDLING FISHERIES STOCKS (Fed. Doc.
Clearing House, Wednesday, Sept. 22, 1993).
11. 139 CONG. REC. E2159 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1993) (statement of Rep. Studds).
12. Senate approval of the bill has been delayed over objections to this agreement
possibility by the New England Fishery Management Council. "Should any 'negotiation
of an international fisheries management agreement of Transboundary Stocks' be
initiated, the Council ... should have a 'more preeminent role' than the advisory status
it receives under the bill." Congress Moves on Fisheries Legislation, COMMERCIAL
FISHERIES NEws, Dec. 1993 at 23A. For an interesting critique of the role of the
Regional Councils in U.S. fishery management, see Ferdinand J. Gallo Ell, Comment,
The Future of Fishery Management and Its Impact on the Seafood Industry: A
Comparison of United States and Canadian Fishery Management Policies After UNCLOS
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haddock." At a time when the United States is urging other countries
to join fisheries management agreements, 14 and advancing the general
argument that fishing countries have a responsibility to participate in
regional fishery conservation and management organizations, it should
have a moral obligation, if not a legal one, to approve the NAFO
legislation.
This Article will present a look at the international legal standard for
fisheries management contained in Article 63 of the Convention of the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I).
Specifically, it will consider whether Article 63(1),'" which imposes a
limited duty on States to seek agreement on transboundary stock
management issues, reflects a generally accepted legal standard and, if
so, how this standard should affect fisheries management in the Gulf of
Maine. The "legislative" history of both sections of Article 63 will be
reviewed,' 6 although the analysis will focus on Article 63(1). The
"straddling stocks" provisions of Article 63(2) and the broader extent of
UNCLOS III negotiations 7 are beyond the scope of this article.
111, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 177 (1992).
13. 139 CONG. REC. E2159 (daily ed., Sept. 14, 1993) (statement of Rep. Studds).
14. Id. For example, the United States is currently urging Mexico to join the
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT), and has been
urging Poland, Korea, Japan, and others to agree to a management treaty for pollock in
the so-called Donut Hole in the Bering Sea. An agreement was reached in February
1994; see 10 OCEAN POLICY NEWS 4-5 (Dec. 1993) (Council on Ocean Law, Wash.,
DC).
15. The other section of Article 63, Article 63(2) has been the focus of additional
United Nations efforts to develop cooperative fishery management for fish stocks which
occur both within the EEZ and in the high seas. The UN Conference on Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks began in 1993 and is expected to report to the
Secretary General by the end of the 49th General Assembly. G.A. Res. 47/192, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/47/192, Jan. 28, 1993.
16. For a thorough discussion of the relationship between provisions (1) and (2) of
Article 63, see ELLEN HEY, THE REGIME FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF TRANSBOUNDARY
MARINE FISHERIES RESOURCES 54-57 (1989).
17. For a general discussion of the progress made on various law of the sea issues
during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, see John R.
Stevenson & Bernard H. Oxman, The Preparations for the Law of the Sea Conference,
68 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1974); The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1975); and Bernard H. Oxman,
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1976 New York Session,
71 AM. J. INT'L L. 247 (1977); _ The 1977 New York Sessions, 72 AM. J. INT'L L.
57 (1978); The Seventh Session (1978), 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1979); _ The
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In order to trace the international legal standard for transboundary
stock management, one must first understand the legal process by which
such a standard is developed. One scholar has defined modem interna-
tional law as "that body of [legal] rules and principles which States ...
recognize as necessary for the maintenance of peace and good order
among themselves, and habitually obey in order to maintain and preserve
that good order."'" It is a law based upon the consent of States, where
a breach of such consent subjects a State to those remedies available in
international law. 9 It follows from this that customary international law
cannot be grounded upon mere convenience or courtesy, but must be
evidenced by a consistent practice by the States in question based upon
their recognition of the appropriate legal rules and regulations. Thus, the
development of customary international law requires an agreement
between two or more States on some norm which is based upon a
perceived legal obligation to follow the norm in question.'
To determine whether an internatinational norm of cooperative
management of transboundary or shared fish stocks exists, this Article
reviews state practice in the years preceding the First United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) in 1958, including a
general review of fisheries agreements for the North Atlantic and North
Pacific, and agreements among European and Asian countries. A brief
review of the cooperative management provisions of the 1958 Geneva
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the High Seas will follow.
The next section will trace the legislative history of Article 63 at
UNCLOS Im, followed by a determination of whether Article 63(1)
represents a codification of the customary law of the sea for cooperative
fisheries management of transboundary stocks. This Article will then
look at recent practices of cooperative management to determine if such
practices are representative of an international standard. The conclusion
will attempt to draw implications for the management of transboundary
fish stocks on Georges Bank.
Eighth Session (1979), 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1980); __Ninth Session (1980), 75 AM.
J. INT'L L. 211 (1981); - The Tenth Session (1981), 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1982).
A good source on developments in the law of the sea can be found in annual SAN
DIEGO L. REv. issues starting with Volume 6 in 1968-1969. The articles detail emerging
issues, chart the progress of UNCLOS TII negotiations and parallel law of the sea issues,
and offer insights as to the makeup of the law of the sea, post-UNCLOS Ell.
18. L.C. GREEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE 40 (1984).
19. Id. at 39.
20. Id. at 48.
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II. COOPERATIVE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT UNTIL UNCLOS I
A. General Practice Regarding Cooperative Fisheries
Management Until UNCLOS I1
Before the advent of exclusive economic zones in the 1970s and
general agreement by the international community on the right of coastal
States to manage the living resources adjacent to their coasts, there was
little need for principles of law regarding cooperative management of
transboundary stocks. This was partly because very few commercial
transboundary fish stocks occurred in the three-mile territorial sea, and
also because fisheries management was a relatively new practice among
coastal States.2 Cooperation in fisheries management, however, did
begin in certain high seas fisheries as early as the mid-1 800s when Great
Britain and France agreed to establish a joint commission to set
regulations for fishing in the nonterritorial waters between the two
countries. 22
In the early 1900s there was growing evidence of overexploitation
of the North Pacific halibut stocks by U.S. and Canadian fishermen. As
a result, the U.S. and Canada signed the Convention for the Preservation
of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean in 1923. 2 This
was the first international fisheries agreement to provide for joint
management of a fishery. The Convention created the International
Fisheries Commission which was charged with the regulation of the
fishery.
One of the original conservation provisions of this Convention called
for a three-month closed season, but it was soon apparent that more
conservation measures were needed. Thus, the Convention was strength-
ened by agreements reached in 1930, 1937, and 1953, giving the
Commission more power to regulate the industry. Under this authority,
the Commission set quotas, regulated gear, closed nursery areas, created
regulations to control incidental catches, and created multiple seasons to
21. L. Nielsen, The Evolution of Fisheries Management Philosophy, 38 MARINE
FISHERIES REVIEW 15 (1976).
22. C. JOHN COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 402-403 (6th ed. 1967).
In 1923, the commission managed oyster fishing by closing the waters to fishing during
most of the summer months.
23. 32 L.N.T.S. 94.
24. Parzival Copes & B.A. Coole, Rationalization of Canada's Paciflc Halibut
Fishery, 8 OCEAN MGMT. 151, 161 (1982).
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allow for a distribution of the fishing effort. The subsequent agreements
also gave the Commission an express mandate to manage the fishery to
achieve maximum sustainable yield levels. These provisions appear to
have worked extremely well through the end of the 1950s.
The halibut fishery, although a jointly exploited stock, was a high
seas fishery and not a fishery exploited within the territorial waters of the
two countries. Perhaps the first agreement for the management of stocks
within the jurisdiction of more than one country was concluded in 1937
between the U.S. and Canada concerning the Fraser River salmon
fisheries. The Convention for the Protection, Preservation, and
Extension of the Sockeye Salmon Fishery of the Fraser River' provided
for the establishment of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries
Commission. The Commission was charged with ensuring adequate
access of the salmon to spawning grounds and dividing the allowable
catch of salmon between the fishermen of the two countries. The
Commission had the authority to make decisions that were directly
binding on the fishermen and did not require any government approval
process?
The first substantial multilateral agreement concerned with the
conservation of jointly exploited fishery resources was the Convention
for the Regulation of the Meshes of Fishing Nets and the Size Limits of
Fish concluded in 1946 among the fishing nations of Northern Europe.'
The main objective of this Convention was to prevent the catch of young,
immature fish in the Northeast Atlantic by promulgating regulations for
minimum mesh size and minimum fish size by species. Because this
agreement tended to discourage the development of fisheries for smaller
species, however, the Convention nations concluded a revised agreement,
the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Convention, in 1963.29 This revised
agreement encompassed all fisheries and all species within the Northeast
Atlantic area. Its main purpose was to make recommendations for
achieving the rational exploitation of Northeast Atlantic fisheries. The
new Convention continued the idea of regulating mesh size and fish size,
but could not make recommendations concerning national quotas. 0
25. Id. at 161-162.
26. 184 L.N.T.S. 306.
27. ALBERTW. KOERS, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF MARINE FISHERIES 82-84
(1973).
28. 231 U.N.T.S. 200.
29. 486 U.N.T.S. 158.
30. KoERS, supra note 27, at 90-92.
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A similar agreement, the International Convention for the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries,3" was concluded in 1949 among the States fishing in
the Northwest Atlantic. The agreement established the International
Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF), which was
charged with regulating fisheries to maintain maximum sustainable
yields. The Commission was more successful in its research activities
than in implementing its management recommendations.32
In 1953, the Convention for the High Seas Fishery of the North
Pacific Ocean came into force between the U.S., Canada, and Japan.33
The Convention established a Commission charged with the maintenance
of maximum sustained productivity of the North Pacific area. The
Convention was also the first to embody the principle of abstention,
whereby each government agreed to refrain from entering the fishery of
stocks that were already fully utilized by one or more of the contracting
States21
In 1956, the Convention Concerning the High Seas Fisheries of the
Northwest Pacific Ocean35 was concluded between Japan and the Soviet
Union. The Convention recognized both a mutual responsibility with
respect to the condition of the fishery resources in the area, and a pledge
to work toward the maintenance of the maximum sustained productivity
of the fisheries in the Northwest Pacific Ocean. The Convention
31. 157 U.N.T.S. 158. This agreement has been superseded. See supra, note 10
and accompanying text.
32. KOERS, supra note 27, at 92-94. For details on the U.S.-Canadian parti-
cipation in ICNAF, see Jill L. Bubier & Alison Rieser, U.S. and Canadian Groundfish
Management in the Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank Region, 10 OCEAN MGMT. 83, 86-89
(1986).
33. 205 U.N.T.S. 65.
34. At the outset, the States agreed that North American salmon, Northeast Pacific
halibut, and Northeast Pacific herring met this criteria, and Japan agreed not to fish for
those stocks in the eastern North Pacific. Most of the Commission's efforts were
devoted to the administration of the abstention principle, but it was also responsible for
research on other fisheries, including king crab, and for making recommendations on
quotas and closing nursery areas. Michael A. Jacobs, United States Participation in
International Fisheries Agreements, 6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 471, 484-487 (1974-1975).
For a more detailed discussion of the Commission see, The International North
Pacific Fisheries Commission: A Thirty-Year Effort to Manage High Seas Salmon and
Some Suggestions for the Future, ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO, (Natural Resources Law
Institute, Lewis & Clark Law School, Portland, OR) May 1985, at 1-9.
35. Convention Concerning the High Seas Fisheries of the Northwest Pacific Ocean,
53 AM. J. INT'L L. 763 (1959).
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established a Commission to carry out the specific conservation
provisions of the Convention Annex. 6
B. UNCLOS I
It is clear, then, that by the close of the 1950s there was a growing
number of voluntary agreements among nations for the purpose of
conserving fishery resources. These agreements were an indication that
the States involved were willing to restrict freedom of fishing on the high
seas in the interest of maintaining fishery resources. There was growing
evidence that properly enforced conservation measures could increase
yields without endangering stocks, that conservation controls could not
be effective unless based on adequate scientific research, and that control
measures would be essentially useless until applicable to all States
exploiting the fishery in question.37
In response to these concerns, the International Law Commission
(ILC)38 prepared draft fisheries articles to be used at the first United
36. These included determining the allowable catch by each State, conducting
research on the fisheries, regulating season length and gear type, and making revisions
in the annex as needed with regard to conservation and increase of the fishery resources
in the Convention area. The annex originally contained conservation and other
regulatory measures for the salmon, herring, and crab fisheries in the Northwest Pacific
Ocean. See generally id. at 763-768.
The Eastern Pacific was also the scene of several agreements between Japan and
China beginning in 1955 that were interesting because they were concluded between
nongovernmental fishery associations and they established certain zones off the Chinese
coast where fishing activity was regulated. Park, Fisheries Issues in the Yellow Sea and
the East China Sea, Law of the Sea Institute Occasional Paper No. 18, 13-15 (Sept.
1973) [hereinafter cited as LOS PAPER 18].
37. William W. Bishop, Jr., Editorial Comment: International Law Commission
Draft Articles on Fisheries, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 627 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Bishop
ILCI.
38. The ILC was formed in 1947 by the General Assembly of the United Nations
to promote the progressive development and codification of international law. The ILC
consists of 15 members who have a recognized competence in international law. The UN
Document (A/504, 20 November 1947) recommending the formation, makeup, and duties
of the ILC can be found at 42 AM. J. INT'L L. Supplement (1948), at 1. For a detailed
and informed discussion of the early UN role in the development of international law and
the formation of the ILC, see Yuen-Li Liang, The GeneralAssembly and the Progressive
Development and Cod ication of International Law, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 66 (1948).
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Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I)." The 1955
ILC Draft Fisheries Articles,' as further refined by a 1956 ILC report,
provided the basis for the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas adopted at
UNCLOS 1. 41
The Convention provided that every State's right to fish on the high
seas was subject not only to its own treaty obligations and the provisions
of the Convention, but also to certain interests and rights of the coastal
States as defined in the Convention. The States were obligated to adopt,
either alone or in cooperation with other States, living resources
conservation measures to be followed by the fishermen of the respective
States. The phrase "conservation of the living resources of the high
seas" was defined as the aggregate of the measures necessary to maintain
the optimum sustainable yield of the resources so as to assure a
maximum supply of food and other marine products.42 The idea that
39. United Nations Report of the International Law Comm'n: Covering the Work
of its Seventh Session, 2 May - 8 July 1955, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 190, 209-210 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as 1956 ILC-AJIL]. The ILC started work on the draft articles in
1951. The main intent of the ILC's work was to recognize the coastal State's interest
in the conservation of fishery resources found in waters adjacent to its territorial sea.
Because of the preliminary work of the ILC, a technical conference was convened in
Rome in 1955 to discuss scientific aspects of international conservation of high seas
fishery resources. The results of this conference were incorporated into the draft
fisheries articles.
40. A general discussion of the 1955 ILC Draft Fisheries Articles can be found at
Bishop ILC, supra note 37, at 629-631. The main points outlined in the draft fisheries
articles were a recognition of the coastal State priority interest in the conservation of the
living resources located in the waters adjacent to its territorial sea, conservation of the
living resources of the high seas, and the creation of an arbitration process to settle
disputes over the use or abuse of conservation principles.
41. William W. Bishop, Jr., The 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1206, 1216
(1962). The 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, (UN Doc. A/CONF.13/L.54 [29 April 1958]) may be found
in 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 851 (1958), in MYRES S. MCDOUGAL& WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE
PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 1164 (1962), and in DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 488 (1965) (Note that further cites to UNCLOS I will
be to its location in 52 AM. J. INT'L L.).
See generally 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 852-855 (1958), compare with 1956 ILC-AJIL,
supra note 39, at 208-215 for differences between the draft fisheries articles and the 1958
Convention.
42. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 851, 852 (1958).
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States fishing alone in an area had a duty to adopt conservation principles
for their nationals fishing in that area was also suggested in the
Convention.43
Article 8 of the Convention recognized that a State could have a
valid interest in certain high seas fisheries not adjacent to its coast,
regardless of whether its nationals fished in those areas. The coastal
State could request that States fishing in the nonadjacent area take
conservation measures necessary to protect the fishery, and, failing
agreement, could resort to the arbitration procedures. The coastal State
had to demonstrate that it had a special interest in the fishery of the
nonadjacent area and present scientific reasons when making its request
to the fishing States.'
C. Cooperative Fisheries Management Practice from
UNCLOS I to UNCLOS III
The period between the conclusion of the first U.N. Law of the Sea
conference and the beginning of the third conference (UNCLOS III) was
characterized by continued progress in cooperative management.
Examples of this progress include fisheries agreements concluded
between the U.S. and Mexico, Japan and Korea, and a multilateral
European Fisheries Convention. It is interesting to note that each of
43. Id. at 852; In fact, Bishop, supra note 41, at 1217, makes a special note of the
significance of establishing a duty upon the fishing State to adopt Conservation measures
rather than merely allowing the fishing State to adopt the conservation measures if it so
wishes.
44. See supra note 42, at 854. The Convention is silent as to what constitutes a
"special interest," but the ILC comment to the draft version of Article 8 provides some
clue to the provision's intent. It suggests that a special interest could arise where the
exhaustion of the living resources in the nonadjacent area would affect the harvest in
another area of the sea where the requesting State's nationals fish. In allowing the
concerned State to act in this manner the ILC was creating a safeguard to the State's
threatened interest. 1956 ILC-AJIL, supra note 39, at 213. In his comment on the 1958
Convention, Professor Bishop noted that special interests could possibly lie where the
nonadjacent fishery was an important consumer product of the requesting State or where
the requesting State desired to fish in the nonadjacent area at some future time. Bishop,
supra note 41, at 1218, n.43. It is even possible that a special interest could be shown
whenever there was a threat of overexploitation of that part of a shared stock that was
being fished for in nonadjacent waters.
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these agreements dealt with both the cooperative management of and
access to fisheries within the fishery zones45 of the respective countries.
The European Fisheries Convention of 1964 was concluded for the
purpose of defining a permanent fishery regime for the parties. The
Convention created a six-mile zone measured from the territorial sea
baseline, a zone within which the contracting coastal States had the
exclusive right to fish, and exclusive jurisdiction over fisheries
management. It also established a zone from six to twelve miles from
the baseline where the right to fish was reserved for the coastal State and
such other contracting States as had habitually fished in that zone
between 1953 and 1963. These contracting States, however, could not
fish for substantially different fish stocks or in new areas of the zone.
The Convention also gave the coastal State the right to regulate the
fisheries, and to enforce those regulations, including internationally
agreed upon conservation measures, provided that the regulations were
not discriminatory between the contracting States.'
Japan and Korea ended nearly 500 years of disputes over fisheries47
with the 1965 Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Korea
Concerning Fisheries. The Agreement's preamble acknowledged that
sustained productivity of the fisheries resources in the waters of mutual
interest should be maintained, that conservation and rational exploitation
of the living resources was in the interest of both countries, that
intermingling of the respective fisheries occurred, and that mutual
cooperation was desired for development of the fisheries. The
Agreement set up twelve-mile exclusive fishery zones for each State and,
more importantly, created a joint control zone with specific boundaries.
It provided that within the joint control zone, management of dragnet
45. These fishery zones, usually 12 miles in breadth, were established by various
nations in response to the failure of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 834 (1958), to satisfy the interests of certain
coastal States in controlling the exploitation of coastal fish stocks. The Convention did
not resolve the issue of the maximum permissible breadth of the territorial sea. The
negotiators were unable to square the coastal States' concerns with the competing
interests of the maritime States, who wanted to retain the concept of a very narrow
territorial sea, and thus maintain maximum freedom of navigation. With the adoption
of these extended zones of exclusive fishery jurisdiction, agreement among nations
became necessary to maintain access and promote conservation.
46. NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 41-48 (S. Houston Lay et al. eds.,
1973) [hereinafter 1 NEW DIRECTIONS].
47. For a general background on these disputes and other issues leading to the 1965
Agreement see, LOS PAPER 18, supra note 36, at 4-12.
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fishing, surrounding-net fishing, and large-boat mackerel fishing was to
be undertaken according to provisional fishing control measures'
included in the Annex to the Agreement. Although the Agreement
allowed for cooperative management of the joint control zone, it did not
provide for cooperative management of stocks that migrated between the
respective fishery zones.4 9
After the U.S. and Mexico established exclusive fishery zones in the
mid-1960s,50 the two governments reached an agreement in 1968
concerning reciprocal fishing rights in the respective zones. The main
point of the agreement was access for fishermen of both countries to the
coastal waters of the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean between nine
and twelve miles offshore, for the purpose of pursuing their traditional
fisheries. Conservation measures in the agreement included the concept
of status quo fishing, requiring that total catches by either side during the
five years after the agreement date could not exceed total catches from
the preceding five years. The agreement also required the governments
to register and report to each other the number and types of fishing
vessels that were to fish under the agreement. Each vessel fishing under
the terms of the agreement had to use gear that was legal in that
particular fishery zone. If additional regulations were needed for con-
servation purposes, consultation and notice were required. An agreement
was also reached to formulate and execute a program of research and
conservation of stocks of common concern off the Mexican coast. 1
This agreement appears to have been in effect until both countries
enlarged their respective fishery zones to 200 miles in the mid-1970s.
Reciprocal agreements were negotiated in 1976 and 1977 to allow
48. Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning Fisheries, 22
June 1965, Japan-Korea, 4 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1128-1133 (1965). These fishing
control measures included limitations on the number of vessels that could operate in the
zone by size, fishery, and seasonal periods, maximum and minimum vessel size limits
by fishery, minimum mesh sizes for dragnet fishing based on vessel size and for certain
mackerel species, and fish-luring light brightness standards for surrounding net fisheries
and mackerel fisheries.
49. Id.
50. The U.S. established a 12-mile exclusive fishery zone, pursuant to Public Law
89-658, 14 October 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1094, 80 Stat. 908 repealed by Pub. L.
No. 265, § 402(a), Apr. 13, 1976, 90 Stat. 360. Mexico established an exclusive fishery
zone pursuant to the law of 9 December 1966, passed by the Mexican Congress. 1 NEw
DIRECTIONS, supra note 46, at 76,78.
51. 1 Nw DIECTiONS, supra note 46, at 78-84.
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continued fishing in the respective zones.52 The two agreements were
similar and made note of the need to cooperate in the conservation and
management of fishery resources, but no provisions were included to
require cooperative management of transboundary stocks, nor were any
dispute procedures set up to handle disagreements on management issues.
The management of each fishery was left to the total discretion of the
respective governments, and fishermen licensed under the agreements
had to abide by the decisions of the government controlling the waters
being fished.
III. COOPERATIVE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT AND THE
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE: ARTICLE 63(1)
State actions in the wake of the Geneva LOS Conventions were
important steps toward establishing a principle of cooperative manage-
ment of transboundary stocks. The key to understanding today's trans-
boundary stock management obligations, however, is Article 63(1) from
the latest law of the sea conference, UNCLOS III. Article 63(1)
represents the first statement made about the duties of States sharing fish
stocks as a result of the most significant legal development regarding
fishery resources adopted in the twentieth century, the regime of the
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). 3
What follows is the "legislative history" of Article 63, which in its
final form reads as follows:
1. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur
within the exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal
States, these States shall seek, either directly or through
52. Fisheries Agreement Between the United States of America and Mexico, Nov.
24, 1976, US.-Mex., 29 U.S.T. 823-848.
53. The Exclusive Economic Zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial
sea, to a distance not exceeding 200 miles from the territorial sea baseline. Within the
EEZ, the coastal State has sovereign rights for conserving, exploiting, and managing the
living and nonliving natural resources in the water and on or under the seabed, and
jurisdiction with regard to the use of artificial islands, marine scientific research, and the
protection and preservation of the marine environment. RENATE PLATZODER, THIRD
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA-DOCUMENTS OF THE GENEVA
SESSION 1975 411-412 (ed. 1982); United Nations, THE LAW OF THE SEA, Official Text
of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea With Annexes and Index, U.N. Sales No.
E.83.V.5 (1983) [hereinafter cited as OFFICIAL TEXT].
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appropriate subregional organizations, to agree upon the
measures necessary to co-ordinate and ensure the conservation
and development of such stocks without prejudice to the other
provision of this Part.
2. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur
both within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond
and adjacent to the zone, the coastal State and the States fishing
for such stocks in the adjacent area shall seek, either directly or
through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to
agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these
stocks in the adjacent area.'
A. The Early Negotiations on Article 63
1. Pre-UNCLOS III
Prior to the start of formal negotiations of UNCLOS H at Caracas,
Venezuela, several proposals on fisheries and the EEZ had been
submitted to Sub-Committee III of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction. 6 Although some of the proposals were changed or replaced
by subsequent submissions in Caracas,' the proposals offer insight into
the attention accorded the conservation of transboundary stocks in the
emerging law of the sea.58
54. OFFIcIAL TEXT, supra note 53, at 22.
55. See generally Official Records of the General Assembly [GAOR], 27th Sess.,
Supp. Supp. No. 21, U.N. Doe. A/8721 (XXXX); GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 21
U.N. Doc. A/9021, Vol. II (XXXX); and GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 21 U.N. Doe.
A/9021, Vol. IV (XXXX). Sub-Committee II was set up to discuss, review, and make
recommendations on traditional law of the sea topics such as maritime boundaries,
fisheries, and navigation.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., statement by Mr. Stevenson concerning the fact that U.S. proposals
at Caracas were meant to replace U.S. articles submitted to Sub-Committee II. II
UNCLOS M1 OFF. REc. 291 (1975) [hereinafter cited as II UNCLOS I].
58. The U.S. delegation at UNCLOS H submitted a comparative table to the
Second Committee in Caracas which summarized proposals that dealt with the living
resources of the sea made by various delegations to Sub-Committee II at the United
Nations. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.1 [21 February 1974], EI UNCLOS El OFF.
REC. V (1975) (referred to in Table of Contents as mimeographed separately)
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Japan introduced several points relevant to cooperative management,
although transboundary stocks were not specifically mentioned. The
Japanese proposals included the concept of cooperative management of
jointly exploited stocks at the request of any State fishing for such
stocks; a requirement that where a management scheme was developed
between jointly exploiting States, any State subsequently entering the
fishery would be required to adopt conservation measures for its
nationals that were as stringent as the existing management scheme; and
a recognition that the coastal State had a special interest in the conserva-
tion of fisheries in its adjacent waters.59
Malta proposed that the coastal State should have an obligation to
cooperate with other States of the region "in the formulation and
implementation of programmes of conservation of the living resources of
[its] national ocean space when there is a need for the application of
regional conservation measures [based on] the existing knowledge of the
fishery." Similar measures were proposed for living resources which
migrate from national ocean space to the international ocean space.6'
The U.S. proposed that "coastal ... resources which are located in
or migrate through waters adjacent to more than one coastal State
[should] be regulated by agreement among such States."''" Canada,
joined by five other nations, was of a similar mind with regard to
regional cooperation and agreement, but focused only on exploitation and
conservation of resources outside the EEZ. Nothing in the Canadian
proposal related directly to transboundary stock management.62
Although the concept of transboundary stock management was only
specifically covered by the U.S. proposal, it is clear that all of the
proposals in some way added to the concept of agreement between States
in the management of the ocean's living resources. There was a move
toward joint development of, or agreement on, management practices in
all areas where two or more States were involved with a fishery. A
[hereinafter cited as UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.11.
59. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.1, supra note 58, at 10. (Note that all the
document excerpts in this UN document came from separate U.N. documents that start
with the classification UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II#).
60. Id. at 16, 20.
61. Id. at 17.
62. Id. at 19. Other proposals that dealt in some way with cooperation in fisheries
management or in establishing cooperative conservation measures were received from
Afghanistan, which joined with others, Argentina, Zaire, and Columbia, with Mexico
and Venezuela. Id. at 9, 11, 19.
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realization of the relative fragility of the stocks in question, and the
futility of managing such stocks if other States were not observing
similar management strategies, might have contributed to this result.
2. Caracas
The first fisheries proposals were submitted to the Second Commit-
tee,' the committee responsible for fisheries and EEZ issues during the
second session of UNCLOS III. Most of the fishery provisions were
included in EEZ draft article proposals. Although few of the proposals
specified principles of cooperative management of transboundary stocks,
they did suggest that States agree on joint exploitation and management.
Members of the European Economic Community (EEC) joined in
presenting specific articles on fisheries. One of the proposals would
have allowed the coastal States, by mutual agreement, to request that
regional fishery organization set allowable catch levels for jointly
exploited stocks. The EEC also proposed the formulation of regional or
species-specific fishery organizations to oversee the exploitation and
conservation of the living resources in the region.' 4
The U.S. proposed specific fisheries articles within its provisions on
the EEZ and continental shelf. These provisions perhaps came the
closest to specifying transboundary stock management standards at the
Caracas sessions. For example, Draft Article 14 of the U.S. proposal
would have allowed agreements to be concluded between neighboring
States to fish in specified areas of their respective EEZs, with details to
be worked out by negotiations between the States. Provisions related to
international cooperation among States also recognized the special status
63. The negotiations at UNCLOS I were mainly conducted within the parameters
set by the three main committees. These committees were patterned after the Sub-
Committees set up to work under the auspices of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.
The First Committee dealt with issues concerning deep seabed mining and the Third
Committee handled negotiations on marine pollution control and marine scientific
research. The Second Committee considered jurisdictional issues, such as the territorial
sea, continental shelf, and EEZ, navigation, delimitation of maritime boundaries,
fisheries, and others. I UNCLOS III OFF. REc. 97-98 (1975) [hereinafter cited as H
UNCLOS MI].
64. Id. at 217-219, Draft Articles 7(3), and 13-18 (1975). (Note that all official
documents cited in this Article are found in the Official Records of UNCLOS III and that
Committee If documents were classified as A/CONF.62/C.11#).
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of transboundary stocks. Draft Article 16(2) stated that coastal States in
a particular region should "with respect to fishing for identical or
associated [or transboundary] species, agree upon the measures necessary
to coordinate and ensure the conservation ... of such species."I
The final submission on fisheries at Caracas was included in draft
articles on the EEZ proposed by members of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU). Although not spelled out specifically, two of the articles
could be interpreted as providing a framework for transboundary stock
management. Draft Article 7 stated that "States in a region [could]
establish regional or subregional arrangements for the purposes of
developing and managing the living resources [of the region]." Draft
Article 9 made it clear that any exploitation activities within a State's
EEZ should be conducted in such a manner so "as not to interfere with
the legitimate interests of other States in the region. "66
At the conclusion of the Caracas session, an informal working paper
was produced which incorporated the main trends of the Second
Committee negotiations.67 It is interesting to note that most of the
fisheries proposals discussed above were included among the main trends
in that working paper.6" Although the session ended with no specific
proposals for transboundary stock management, the trend was clearly in
the direction of agreement between parties, rather than unilateral
management.
B. The Development of Article 63
When the conference reconvened in Geneva on 17 March 1975, the
Second Committee was prepared to review the "main trends" informal
65. Id. at 222-224, Draft Articles 11-21.
66. Id. at 240-241. Three other EEZ/fisheries proposals were received from
Nigeria, U.S.S.R. and other socialist States, and the land-locked and other geographically
disadvantaged States (LLGOS). None of these made specific cooperative management
recommendations, but they did express a recognition of the need for regional cooperation
and the need for conservation measures to be applied in managing fisheries resources.
See generally HI UNCLOS II, supra note 63, at 199, 214, and 216 (Draft Article 2) and
II UNCLOS II, supra note 57 at 172, jq 13, 18 and 221, '1 52.
67. 1I UNCLOS 1H, supra note 63, at 107-142.
68. See e.g., id. at 122 (Provision 98, Formula C) (OAU proposal); 123-124
(Provision 104, Formula B and Provision 108, Formula C(2)) (U.S. proposals); 128-129
(Provision 128, Formula B(3) and Provision 130, Formulas B(1) and B(4)) (EEC propos-
als).
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working paper discussed above. The basic tenor of work included a
second reading of the "main trends" document to consolidate the options
therein, with informal working groups set up to reconcile divergent
views. Although the informal working group meetings were no doubt
very productive, leading as they did to the first negotiating text,69 there
is no real record of the discussion leading up to the articles produced for
the full Committee.7° Because it is difficult to uncover the position of
the individual members of the various groups on specific issues, the
results of one of the more successful groups, the so-called Evensen
Group, will be considered. 7'
The Evensen Group consisted of thirty to fifty States, including the
U.S. and Canada, from all geographic areas and interest groups,
although membership was weighted in favor of coastal States and those
States with broad continental shelves.' The Evensen Group had been
working on a package of all the Second Committee issues since 1973,
and by Geneva it had almost concluded work on a draft package of EEZ
issues.' The final Article 63 provisions are very similar to paragraphs
69. See generally IV UNCLOS III OFF. REC. 27, 29-31, 36, 73-80 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as IV UNCLOS III].
70. For example, the records for the EEZ informal group indicate that it met four
times and considered the specific content of the EEZ. It is also known that discussions
about the specific content of the EEZ included conservation and management of the
living resources of the EEZ, and fishery agreements with neighboring States. Id. at 13,
28 and at 196, 16.
71. For a general discussion of the input of the Evensen and other negotiating
groups to the work of the Second and Third committees at UNCLOS III, see Edward
Miles, An Interpretation of the Geneva Proceedings-Part/1, 3 OcEAN DEv. AND INT'L
L. 303 (1976).
72. Id. at 317 (letter by members of Landlocked and Geographically Dis-
advantaged States (LLGDS) Group discussing makeup of the Evensen Group and
problems thereof).
73. Id. at 304. The Evensen Group Draft, along with positions from other informal
groups, was forwarded to the Chairman of the Second Committee to be considered for
inclusion in the Informal Single Negotiating Text (Single Text). Id. at 308. The Single
Text was the first of three negotiating texts developed during UNCLOS m" negotiations.
The Single Text can be found at IV UNCLOS III, OFF. REc. 137 (1975). The Single
Text was followed by the Revised Single Negotiating Text in 1976, Parts I, II, and III
of the Revised Text can be found at V UNCLOS III OFF. REC. 125 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as V UNCLOS 191] and Part IV can be found at VI UNCLOS III OFF. REc. 144
(1977). The Revised Text was followed by the Informal Composite Negotiating Text in
1977. The entire Composite Text and Explanatory Memorandum by the Conference
President can be found in VIII UNCLOS III OFF. REc. 65 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
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2 and 3 of the Evensen Group's Draft Article 7.74 According to one
commentator, the other two provisions of Article 7 and the "equitable
allocation" language of paragraph 2 were omitted because they en-
croached too severely upon coastal States' authority within the EEZ.75
Thus, by 1976, relatively early in UNCLOS III negotiations, draft treaty
language emerged that contained Article 6376 substantially as it appears
in the final treaty.7
VIII UNCLOS i1].
74. Article 7 of the Evensen Group Draft (16 April 1975) reads in its entirety:
Cooperation
1. States shall cooperate, without prejudice to the provisions of articles 5 and
6, in seeking to elaborate standards and guidelines for conservation and
rational utilization of the living resources in the economic zone, directly or
within the framework of appropriate international fisheries organization,
whether universal or regional.
2. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur within the
economic zones of two or more coastal States, these States shall seek either
directly or through appropriate regional or sub-regional organizations to agree
upon the measures necessary to co-ordinate and ensure the conservation and
equitable allocation of such stocks without prejudice to the other provisions of
this Chapter.
3. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both within
the economic zone, and in an area beyond and adjacent to the economic zone,
the coastal State and States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall
seek either directly or through appropriate regional or subregional organi-
zations to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these
stocks in the adjacent areas.
4. Coastal States shall give timely notice of conservation and management
regulations.
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 7 are substantially the same as Article 63 of UNCLOS Ill,
although "equitable allocation" is replaced by "development" in the final version of
Article 63(1). The entire Evensen Group Draft on the EEZ can be found in Miles, supra
note 71, at 326.
75. Miles, supra note 71, at 309-310.
76. Note that Article 52 in the Single Text is renumbered as Article 63 in the final
version of UNCLOS Ill.
77. A review of the other informal working group submissions reveals that, besides
the Evensen Group, only the EEC Group had a provision dealing with transboundary
stocks. Yet the EEC transboundary stock provision was merely a condensed version of
the Evensen proposal discussed above. PLATZODER, supra note 53, at 299, Article C(2)
(ed. 1982).
The proposals on the EEZ by the major informal groups to the Chairman of the
Second Committee can be found in PLATZODER, id., at 262 (Group of 77), 273 (Evensen
Group), 285 and 290-294 (LLGDS Group), (EEC Group).
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Article 63 did receive further consideration during the remaining
sessions of UNCLOS Im, but the negotiations and proposed amendments
focused on Article 63(2). This section of Article 63 addresses the
management of "straddling stocks,"' those which occur both within the
EEZ and in the area beyond or adjacent to the EEZ. Argentina and
Canada introduced a series of compromises for Article 63(2) in an effort
to strengthen coastal States' fights in managing stocks adjacent to their
EEZs. These actions kept all of Article 63 under discussion until the end
of the Conference in 1982. 79
Silence by the other groups on the issue could indicate that transboundary stock
management was not considered as vital or controversial an issue as some others, and
acquiescence on this issue by the European group, an area where transboundary stocks
could frequently occur, indicates initial acceptance of Article 63 by the international
community as the standard for transboundary stock management. This view is reinforced
by the fact that the Revised Text only added the title to the Article 63 provision.
It appears that after an article-by-article reading of the Single Text, issues besides
transboundary stock management, such as the rights of land-locked States to exploit EEZ
resources, delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf, and inclusion of the EEZ in the
definition of the high seas, were determined to require more extensive negotiations. V
UNCLOS III, supra note 73, at 153 9, 11-14. By the end of 1976, Article 63 was
essentially complete.
The end of the sixth session of UNCLOS I in 1977 produced a new draft treaty
that incorporated changes, inter alia, in the area of the legal status of the EEZ, a more
precise definition of the continental shelf, rights of access by the land-locked and other
geographically disadvantaged States, and archipelagic State rights. VII UNCLOS I,
supra note 73, at 68-69. However, no substantial changes were made to the content of
Article 63. Id. at 15 (Note that in the composite Text Article 63 is numbered Article
63).
78. These stocks are distinguished from transboundary stocks in that they move
from an area of coastal State jurisdiction to an area of the high seas.
79. Argentina sought to amend Article 63(2) by replacing the word "seek" with "be
obliged," and by adding language specifying measures to be included in fishing
agreements with other States and requiring any State fishing for the stocks to abide by
the coastal State's fishery management regulations. XII UNCLOS III OFF. REc. 93
(1980) (reporting on a suggestion made by Argentina).
At the Ninth session of UNCLOS M in 1980, Canada expressed its support for the
Argentine proposal by circulating a compromise proposal that would have given coastal
States even greater recognition of their interests in fish stocks overlapping the 200-mile
limit. XIII UNCLOS III OFF. REc. 8, 21 (1981) [hereinafter cited as XIII UNCLOS
III].
The Canadian Compromise Article 63(2) [10 April 1980] reads in its entirety:
2. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both within the
exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone, the
coastal State and the States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall
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seek either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional organizations
to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks in
the adjacent area and, in any event, shall adopt or co-operate in adopting such
measures. In the event that agreement is not reached within a reasonable
period and proceedings are instituted before the appropriate tribunal pursuant
to article 286, that tribunal shall determine the measures to be applied in the
adjacent area for the conservation of these stocks and shall determine
provisional measures if definitive measures cannot be determined within a
reasonable period. In establishing such measures, the tribunal shall take into
account those measures applied to the same stocks by the coastal State within
its exclusive economic zone and the interests of States fishing these stocks.
XII UNCLOS III, supra, at 104.
Canada was very concerned that the existing Article 63(2) provisions left the stocks
overlapping the 200-mile limit vulnerable to predatory practices of distant water fishing
fleets. XIII UNCLOS III, supra, at 103, 20, It is probable that Canada was also
concerned with the maintenance of healthy Grand Banks fish stocks which occurred
outside its 200-mile EEZ.
The debate on Article 63(2) continued throughout the resumed ninth session of
UNCLOS III in 1980. Argentina and fourteen other States proposed a further rewording
that would have brought Article 63(2) in line with Article 117, which requires States to
regulate the high seas fishing of their nationals.
Article 117 reads in its entirety:
Duty of States to adopt with respect to their nationals measures for the
conservation of the living resources of the high seas.
All States have the duty to take, or cooperate with other States in
taking, such measures for their respective nationals as may be
necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high
seas.
OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 53, at 38.
Canada supported this proposal, XIV UNCLOS III OFF. REc. 154, J1 10-11 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as XIV UNCLOS ] but in light of continued opposition from distant
water fishing nations, offered an amended version of Article 63(2) that received favorable
response from many of the nations involved, including those with distant water fishing
fleets. XIV UNCLOS Im, supra, at 154, J 10.
The Amended Canadian Compromise (3 October 1980) reads in its entirety:
2. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both within the
exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone, the
coastal State and the other States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area
shall co-operate either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional
organizations in adopting such measures for their respective nationals as may
be necessary for the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent area.
XIV UNCLOS III, supra.
The U.S. delegation concluded that opposition to the Argentine and Canadian
proposals came from States concerned with expanding coastal State jurisdiction. The
delegation noted that the initial acquiescence to the scaled down amendment turned into
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The Draft Convention s  that was produced at the end of the ninth
session of UNCLOS III contained no changes in Article 63(2), apparently
because no consensus could be reached on the need to strengthen those
provisions. The production of the Draft Convention did not, however,
stop attempts to change Article 63(2). The tenth session saw a continued
attempt by Argentina and Canada to strengthen Article 63(2), but the
move continued to be opposed by States with distant water fishing
fleets.8s
At the eleventh and final negotiating session of UNCLOS I, one
last attempt was made by Argentina and Canada to encourage increased
cooperation for the conservation of straddling stocks, but the effort to
achieve a consensus on this issue was blocked by the Soviet Union on
procedural and substantive grounds.' Thus, despite these attempts to
strengthen Article 63(2), Article 63 remained virtually unchanged from
its initial form early in UNCLOS III negotiations to the presentation of
the final version of UNCLOS III for signature in 1982.
IV. ARICLE 63(1) AS A CODIFICATION OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Conflicting statements about whether UNCLOS III reflects a
codification of international law cast some doubt as to the international
opposition by the end of the session. It also noted that despite Canadian and Argentine
concerns, the dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS Ell would be applicable in those
areas of the seas beyond the EEZ where violations of internationally recognized
conservation measures occurred. Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Ninth Session
(Resumed) at UNCLOS LI in Geneva, 1982, REPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES
DELEGATION TO THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
(Myron H. Nordquist and Choon-ho Park eds., Law of the Sea Institute Occasional Paper
No. 33, 441 (1983)) [hereinafter cited as LOS PAPER 33].
80. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/REV.3/Add.1 (28 August 1980).
81. LOS PAPER 33, supra note 79, at 465. The Drafting Committee of UNCLOS
II also considered harmonizing Article 63(2) with Article 117. However, the Committee
could not agree on sending this and other related problems back to competent conference
committees. Id. at 492, 499.
82. LOS PAPER, supra note 79, at 549. A move to put an amendment to a vote
was stopped because of the efforts by the President of UNCLOS I to avoid as many
votes as possible on substantive issues. Id.
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legal status of Article 63.83 It is necessary, therefore, to review fisheries
agreements in effect at the time of UNCLOS III to determine if Article
63(1) reflected actual state practice. In conducting this review it should
be noted that the duty evidenced in Article 63(1) that States "shall seek
... to agree upon the measures" is very limited in its legal application.
Of all the fishery management agreements discussed above, only the
Fraser River Salmon Convention specifically concerned itself with the
management of a transboundary fishery. Yet the Fraser River Salmon
Convention was not necessarily born out of a perceived legal obligation
to manage the transboundary stocks. It was more likely the result of a
realization that the salmon stocks of the Fraser River were seriously
threatened without such cooperation. The Fraser River Salmon
Convention, which preceded UNCLOS III by 45 years, did continue the
negotiating procedures set by Canada and the U.S. in the previous
Halibut Convention. Nevertheless, these procedures were not the result
of any perceived legal obligation to cooperate in the management of the
respective stocks.
This last point is important when one considers that until UNCLOS
I there was no legal obligation to cooperatively manage any fish stocks,
primarily because of the limited breadth of territorial waters and the high
seas freedom of fishing. The codification process of UNCLOS I,
however, recognized the growing trend of multilateral and bilateral
agreements for cooperative management of high seas fisheries and
imposed a legal duty upon States both to respect the coastal State's
interest in fisheries off its coasts and to cooperate in the management of
those stocks that were jointly exploited. It may also be argued that this
practice had become so widespread as to make it binding upon nonsig-
natory States in the interest of conserving the ocean's living resources.
It is unfortunate that the actual practice was not as widespread with
respect to transboundary stock problems as envisioned in Article 63(1),
but this is partly because of the relative newness of the 200-mile EEZ
concept.
83. See, e.g., statements by President Reagan, Ambassador Clingan, and President
Koh concerning the international status of UNCLOS m. President Reagan's UNCLOS
III Statement of 9 July 1982, DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 1982, at 71, Statement by the Head
of the U.S. Delegation of the Final Session of UNCLOS III on 9 December 1982, LOS
PAPER 33, supra note 79, at 665, 667, Statement by the President Concerning United
States Oceans Policy on 10 March 1983, 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 464 (1983), and
Statement by the President of the Conference on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982,
LOS PAPER 33, supra note 79, at 686-689.
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This lack of actual practice, however, does not necessarily mean that
Article 63(1) cannot be considered a codification of customary law on the
subject. The main reasons for this are found in the evolution of Article
63 and in the form of negotiation at UNCLOS III. As discussed above,
Article 63 was essentially settled in its final form at the end of the first
Geneva negotiating session in 1975. The Article survived attempts by
Canada and Argentina to strengthen the straddling stocks provision. The
fact that the Article was open to scrutiny until the end of the negotiations
and emerged unchanged, strengthens the argument that it represents a
codification of internationally accepted State practice.
The negotiation process at UNCLOS Ill also supports the codifica-
tion argument. UNCLOS I[I was negotiated, until the final vote, by the
process of consensus, or decision making by consent without resort to
voting. In practice, this meant that each of the negotiating texts
developed by the chairmen of the various committees, were based on the
results of proposals and discussions put forward at various times by
delegations and informal groups, such as the Evensen Group, at the
Conference. These texts were in turn distributed for review by the
delegations and their respective governments. The results of these
reviews were transmitted back to the committee chairmen. Silence on
any particular Article played a large role in determining the final form
of UNCLOS III because no objection became a sign of acquiescence or
consensus8I Thus, Article 63, which survived seven years of negotiating
within this consensus method, emerged as the generally accepted practice
in international law with regard to transboundary stock management.
Before examining the use of this standard, however, it should be
emphasized that the duty referred to in Article 63(1) is limited in regard
to its legal application. Article 63(1) addresses activities occurring
within the EEZ of the respective States. Within the EEZ, disagreements
dealing with fisheries are not subject to the compulsory dispute
settlement procedures of other provisions of UNCLOS Iml. Even if one
of the coastal States alleges gross failure on the part of a neighboring
coastal State to apply conservation measures or other UNCLOS III
fisheries provisions to its EEZ, the conciliation procedure cannot be used
to override the coastal State's discretion in managing its EEZ living
84. For a discussion of the use of consensus in the UNCLOS HI proceedings, see
Barry Buzan, Negotiating by Consensus: Developments in Technique at the United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 324 (1981).
26 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1:1
resources. 5 Thus, as one State Department observer has commented,
with or without Article 63(1), the States sharing transboundary stocks
need to sit down and talk.86 In fact, this same observer and others have
noted that it is entirely possible that the legal leverage to be applied in
gaining agreement on the cooperative management of straddling stocks'
is much greater than the leverage that can be applied for transboundary
stock management agreements.88 There was an attempt by the U.S.,
Japan, and the Soviet Union to include compulsory dispute settlement
procedures for EEZ management problems, but this was strongly
opposed by, among others, Latin American countries.89 We are,
therefore, left with an international standard in Article 63(1) that is
relatively easy to understand and apply, but imposes only a limited duty
to act.
Despite its apparent weakness in forging agreement on transboundary
stock management problems, and its lack of guidance on the management
of shared stocks, Article 63(1) does provide a starting point. It
recognizes the special status of transboundary stocks and the associated
problem of effectively managing those stocks. It also recognizes the
importance of other species associated with the transboundary stocks
within the ecosystem and allows for their inclusion in any management
agreement. Finally, while the Article only requires neighboring States
to discuss transboundary stock management, it may also be seen as
imposing something of a moral obligation to agree on cooperative
management to ensure the conservation and development of the
transboundary stocks.
85. OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 53, at 494-496, Articles 296(3)(a), 296(3)(c).
86. Interview with Bill Sullivan, Dep't of State, Office of Fishery Affairs (June 27,
1985).
87. See text accompanying supra note 78.
88. Id. See also William T. Burke, The Law of the Sea Convention Provisions on
Conditions of Access to Fisheries Subject to National Jurisdiction, 63 OR. L. REv. 73,
103-106, 110-115 (1984).
89. Interview with former Ambassador Thomas Clingan, Univ. of Miami School
of Law (June 28, 1985).
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V. STATE ACTION WITH REGARD To TRANSBOUNDARY STOCK
MANAGEMENT SINCE 1980
With these ideas in mind, the following discussion focuses on three
agreements that address transboundary management issues.' ° All of the
negotiations were started prior to the presentation of the draft treaty at
UNCLOS III, but were concluded afterward and, therefore, with the full
knowledge of the contents of Article 63. There is also a discussion of
the 1979 East Coast Fisheries Agreement between the U.S. and Canada,
which, although unratified, demonstrated the recognition by these parties
of the basic principle embodied in Article 63(1).
A. The Baltic Sea Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of Living Resources
In September, 1973, the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of
Living Resources in the Baltic Sea and the Belts (Gdansk Convention)
was signed by the Soviet Union, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, West
Germany, East Germany, and Poland. The Gdansk Convention
recognized the joint responsibility of the parties for the conservation and
rational exploitation of the living resources of the Baltic Sea Basin, as
well as the need to expand cooperation on these issues. In fact, the
Convention imposed a duty on the States to cooperate closely on
preserving, conserving, and increasing the yield of the living resources,
and to prepare and put into effect the necessary organizational and
technical means to carry out the measures necessary to meet the duty.
The Convention covered all fish species and other living resources of the
Baltic Sea Basin."
In 1983, the Council of European Communities approved the
accession of the EEC to the Gdansk Convention with the express purpose
of contributing to the conservation of the living resources of the Baltic
Sea Basin where EEC fishermen also fish. 2  The Convention was
90. For a discussion of additional agreements relating to transboundary stocks
concluded during this time period, see HEY, supra note 16 at 147-53, 161-63, 165-68.
91. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources in the Baltic
Sea and the Belts, 5 NEw DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 145-152 (S. Houston
Law, et al. eds. 1975).
92. Council of the European Communities Decision of 19 April 1983 to Approve the
Accession of the EEC to the Gdansk Convention, 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 704-705
(1983).
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amended at that time to strengthen the Baltic Sea Fishery Commission's
duties to allow for more coordination of management and scientific
research of the living resources of the area, and for more analysis of the
data supplied by contracting States with regard to the implementation of
Commission recommendations.93
While no mention is specifically made of transboundary stock
management, it is clear that the aim of the Gdansk Convention and the
subsequent Protocol was cooperation in the management, conservation,
and utilization of all the resources of the Baltic Sea Basin by the States
that fish that area. It is equally clear that the States in question did seek
to agree and, in fact, did agree on the measures necessary to ensure the
effective management of all fish stocks, including transboundary stocks,
in the Baltic Sea.
B. The Common Fisheries Policy of the EEC
Beginning with the European Fisheries Convention, discussed above,
the European Community has recognized a continuing need to cooperate
on fisheries issues. In October, 1970, the Council of the European
Communities issued a regulation laying down a common structural policy
for the fishing industries of the EEC in an attempt to harmonize all
fishery operations. The regulation recognized the need for member
States to have equal access to all the waters of the EEC and at the same
time to adopt measures to safeguard and conserve the fish stocks in the
waters of the EEC.94
The accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom to the
EEC in 1972 created some changes to the 1970 EEC regulations. The
Articles of Accession allowed fishing within six miles of the coasts of
member States, and within twelve miles in certain instances, to be
restricted to those vessels which had traditionally fished in those areas,
or which operated from ports in the geographical coastal area. However,
these new restrictions could not prejudice any special fishing rights
enjoyed at the end of January, 1971. These changes were not mandatory
for States which wished to maintain the existing situation, and six years
93. Protocol of 11 November 1982 to the Conference of the State Parties to the
Gdansk Convention, 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 705-707 (1983).
94. 1970 Council Regulation Laying Down a Common Structural Policy for the
Fishing Industry, 10 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 479-483 (S. Houston Lay,
et al. eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as 10 NEW DIRECTIONS].
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after accession, the Council was to determine the status of fishing
conditions with regard to protecting fishing grounds and conserving the
biological resources of the sea. The exceptions to the 1970 EEC regula-
tions could be used until the end of 1982. 9
In October 1976, with an eye toward the extension of EEC member
States' fishery zones to 200 miles, the Council adopted a regulation that
called for the establishment of an EEC system for the conservation and
management of fishery resources within the 200-mile zones.96 A few
weeks later the Council issued a statement announcing the official
extension of the fishing zones off EEC member States' coasts to 200
miles. The statement noted that until EEC measures were in place on
conservation of resources, no unilateral conservation measures were to
be implemented. The statement did allow for such unilateral action,
dependent upon continued consultation with member States, if EEC
measures were not forthcoming for 1977.9
The framework outlined in the 1976 EEC regulations was put into
place over the next few years.9" One legal scholar noted that one of the
reasons it took the EEC so long to adopt a Common Fisheries Policy was
the problem of agreeing on the allocation of stocks that were
"common".' 9 During this period, the EEC concluded separate agree-
ments with Norway concerning the establishment of a total allowable
catch for transboundary stocks, an allocation of that catch between the
EEC, Norway, and any other third parties, and the setting of other
conservation measures." °° In 1983, more EEC regulations were issued
that provided for EEC decisions on conservation measures and on the use
and distribution of the resources. Specific regulations were issued on
95. Treaty of Accession of Denmark, Norway, Ireland, and the United Kingdom -
Fishing Rights, 1 NEw DIREcTIoNs, supra note 46, at 57-59.
96. 1976 Proposal for the Establishment of a Community System for the
Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources, 10 NEw DIRECTIONS, supra note
94, at 489-493.
97. 1976 Hague Resolution Declaring an EEC 200-Mile Fishing Zone, 10 NEW
DIRECTIONS, supra note 94, at 494-495.
98. For a detailed discussion of the political maneuvering and other debates
concerning EEC common fisheries development see JOHN FARNELL & JAMES ELLES, IN
SEARCH OF A COMMON FISHERIES POLICY (1984) [hereinafter cited as EEC FISHERIES].
99. Burke, supra note 88 at 105, n. 116.
100. ROBIN R. CHURCHILL & ALAN V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 207 (1983).
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minimum mesh sizes, by-catch rates, minimum fish sizes, and fishing
limits as to areas, time periods, and gear.10'
The EEC, while making few specific regulations concerning trans-
boundary stock management," ° has provided a framework for its use.
In fact, as with the Baltic Sea fisheries, the parties in question recognized
a problem and agreed to work on an acceptable solution. In this
instance, the standard of Article 63(1) has been used through the auspices
of a regional body to agree on cooperative management and conservation
measures for shared fisheries.
C. 1979 East Coast Fisheries Agreement
In March, 1979, the U.S. and Canada signed the Agreement on East
Coast Fisheries Resources, 0 3 which would have created a framework for
joint management of transboundary stocks in the Gulf of Maine-Georges
Bank region. The Fisheries Agreement proposed establishing a joint East
Coast Fisheries Commission with seven members from each country and
two co-chairs. In addition, the Agreement divided the species in
question into three groups: "A" stocks were transboundary and were to
be managed jointly by the commission; "B" stocks were those of mutual
interest and were to be managed primarily by one country, under a plan
approved by both; and "C" stocks were to be managed completely by
one country under its own domestic fishery management regulations.
Any unresolvable disputes would have been submitted to binding
arbitration. 1°
101. EEC FISHERIES, supra note 98, at 203-204.
102. One commentator explains the lack of specific language concerning trans-
boundary stocks in the EEC agreement by concluding that for the purposes of the EEC
"there are no transboundary stocks... .all marine resources are treated as if they were
resources of the Community and not of individual member states." HEY, supra note 16,
at 141.
103. Annexes to Counter Memorial, supra note 1, at Vol. 1, 251-326.
104. For a description of the Agreement and U.S. views concerning its provisions,
see House and Senate Hearings on 1979 Agreement: U.S.-Canadian Fishing Agreements,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter
cited as 1979 House Hearings]; Maritime Boundary Settlement Treaty and East Coast
Fisheries ResourcesAgreement, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Senate Hearings]. See also OVER-
SIGHT REPORT ON THE U.S.-CANADA EAST COAST FISHERY AGREEMENT AND BOUNDARY
TREATY: H.R. Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Subcomm. on Fisheries and
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While the Commission was to determine overall yearly catch totals
for each species in Annexes A and B, the agreement specified the
percentages each country would receive. For example, the U.S. would
have received most of the groundfish (83 percent of cod, 79 percent of
haddock, and 90 percent of silver and red hake). In return, Canada
would have received 73.35 percent of the scallops from east of the Great
South Channel, leaving 26.65 percent of the scallop catch for the United
States. 105
After extensive hearings before the U.S. House of Representatives
and preliminary hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
President Reagan withdrew the Agreement from the Senate in March,
1981, in response to strong opposition to its ratification. Reasons
expressed at the hearings included the fact that the Agreement would
have been permanent and subject to only minor changes in allocations
once ratified;"° it fixed the U.S. share of scallops at a time when the
industry was growing; and it limited the authority of the regional fishery
management councils created by the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976 (MFCMA).0 7
During the proceedings of the Gulf of Maine case, Canada took the
position that the Fisheries Agreement, while not binding upon the parties,
Wildlife Conservation, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
Annex "A" stocks included mackerel, pollock, cusk and until the boundary
was settled, lobster, "B" stocks under primary U.S. management included
Atlantic herring, illex squid in areas 5Z and 6, 5Z cod, and area 5 haddock.
"B" stocks under Canadian primary management included Georges Bank
scallops and illex squid in areas 3 and 4. "C" stocks under exclusive U.S.
management included 5Y cod, area 5 redfish, loligo squid from areas 5 and
6, and other Atlantic groundfish species found in area 5 and not otherwise
dealt with in the A, B, C annexes. "C" stocks subject to exclusive Canadian
management control included areas 3 and 4 redfish, area 4 haddock and cod,
and area 3 and 4 other groundfish. The area numbers refer to ICNAF
statistical divisions.
1979 House Hearings, supra, at 60-67.
105. 1979 House Hearings, supra note 104, at 60-67.
106. The percentage entitlements could be reviewed at the request of either party
at the end of each 10-year period, but neither party's entitlements could be reduced by
more than one third from what it originally was (unless the parties mutually agreed to
greater reductions). 1979 House Hearings, supra note 104, at 63.
107. 1979 House Hearings, supra note 104, at 57-60. See generally 1980 Senate
Hearings, supra note 104. The MFCMA can be found at 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1882
(1993). For a discussion of the history of U.S. and Canadian Atlantic groundfish
management, see Bubier & Rieser, supra note 32, at 86-90.
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was evidence of Canada's traditional participation in the fisheries of
Georges Bank and represented the "best objective evidence of what the
Parties themselves considered an equitable solution" in relation to
fisheries."I The U.S. on the other hand, dismissed the Fisheries
Agreement outright because the rights to Georges Bank fishery resources
granted to Canada by the Agreement were inconsistent with rights
accruing to the U.S. under the jurisdiction of the 200-mile EEZ. The
U.S. also argued that it was contrary to the intent of the MFCMA. 1 9 It
should be noted that although both sides used the Fisheries Agreement
to their advantage in their pleadings before the Special Chamber, neither
side denounced the principles behind the negotiations that led to the
Agreement, nor did either side abandon the principle of seeking to agree
on transboundary stock management issues.
While the Agreement never entered into force, it was negotiated and
signed by both countries, demonstrating that the U.S. and Canada did
seek to agree on a transboundary management issue. At the time of the
negotiations, the U.S. and Canada were following the growing consensus
emerging at UNCLOS III on the standard embodied in Article 63(1); the
fact that the Agreement never became binding should not diminish the
attempt to agree on these fisheries issues. The fact that the Agreement
was negotiated is evidence of U.S. and Canadian acceptance of Article
63(1) as the international legal standard for cooperative management of
transboundary fish stocks.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The early history of fishery agreements was characterized by
negotiations for access. This trend began to change in the early 1900s
when agreements introduced the ideas of preservation and cooperative
management of the living resources of the high seas. These types of
agreements continued through the end of the 1950s, by which time the
emphasis had switched to the theme of coastal State preference for
managing and utilizing the living resources adjacent to its coasts. This
concept was codified in UNCLOS I, which gave coastal States a much
greater voice in the conservation, management, and utilization of the
living resources in the high seas adjacent to their coasts. The interim
period between UNCLOS I and UNCLOS III was characterized by a
108. Reply-Canada, Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 1, at 105, J1 248, 250.
109. Reply-United States, Gulf of Maine Case at 19-23, supra note 1, at 'H 30-37.
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return to access issues, in addition to continued management concerns,
as more and more States increased the scope of their fishery jurisdic-
tions. By the middle of the 1970s and the negotiations at UNCLOS III,
however, management issues had become a higher priority for the
concerned countries. This period also signaled the emergence and
acceptance of the 200-mile EEZ, giving coastal States additional
authority to manage and utilize the living resources off their coasts.
Article 63(1) emerged from early UNCLOS III negotiations in its
final form. It creates a duty for those coastal States that exploit trans-
boundary stocks to discuss together the management of such stocks, and
a moral obligation actually to agree on those measures necessary to
coordinate conservation and utilization of those stocks. Article 63(1)
does not, however, create a framework for such coordination, nor does
it specify which factors, such as biology, traditional fishing rights, or
social and economic considerations, should be weighed in reaching such
agreements. Nevertheless, the Article does represent a codification of
the customary international law on the subject because of the nature of
the consensus negotiation process used at UNCLOS H and in light of
recent State practice.
Canada and the U.S. face many decisions concerning the future of
their shared fishery resources. By attempting to conclude the East Coast
Fisheries Agreement, the U.S. and Canada signaled their acceptance of
Article 63(1) as the international legal standard to apply in cooperative
management of transboundary fish stocks. Regardless of the individual
U.S. or Canadian stance with respect to UNCLOS I as a whole,
customary international law as codified in Article 63(1) on transboundary
stock management imposes an obligation on the two States to follow that
standard. This is enforced by the knowledge, as was previously apparent
with the Baltic Sea Agreement, and as is now apparent given the critical
state of the Georges Bank fishery, that some agreement must be reached
in light of the ominous consequences of nonagreement.
The precipitous drop in stock levels in the Georges Bank region
indicates that it is more urgent than ever that Canada and the U.S. find
management approaches that can rebuild those stocks. One such
approach is contained in the proposed enabling legislation concerning
U.S. participation in NAFO. This legislation authorizes and encourages
the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations with Canada for the purpose
of entering into a fishery agreement, with particular emphasis on the
cooperative management of transboundary stocks occurring in the
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Georges Bank region."' Although the bill has been opposed by the
Regional Councils, which believe they should have a more significant
role in developing such cooperative management plans, the Senate must
not allow internal political issues to unduly influence its deliberations.
The Senate has an obligation to consider the larger responsibility of the
U.S. to comply with the duty imposed by Article 63(1), and to follow
the international legal standard by approving the NAFO legislation.
110. H.R. 3188, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 208 (1993).
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